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Appendix A: Maintaining equilibrium levels of party choice and turnout, using IMD data
In the chapter I co-authored with Georg Lutz on partisanship in the process of party choice (Franklin
and Lutz 2020) we demonstrated the way in which variations in policy congruence between voters and
parties govern fluctuations in party support around a central tendency established by partisanship,
consistent with classic theorizing (Campbell et al. 1960). In this appendix, I revisit and build on those
findings to suggest a linkage between party support and turnout such that voter-party proximity
maintains not only an equilibrium level for party choice but for turnout as well.
Operationalizing the discussion surrounding Figure 1 in the main text, two equations govern the
equilibrium level of party support. These equations define a balance of forces that push party support
in opposite directions. Here I propose that a corresponding equilibrium level of turnout is governed by
a third equation (an equation that I will divide between two models for analysis purposes), having
terms taken from the first two (all three equations will be explained in coming paragraphs).1
First, voters give increased support to parties that become closer to them in policy terms:
∆Support t = Support t-1 + ∆Proximity t + Proximity t-1

(1: party support)

Second, parties adjust their policy offerings in reaction to any loss of support:
∆Proximity t = Proximity t-1 - ∆Support t-1 - Support t-2

(2: feedback)

Third, turnout (a multi-party view of party support) reflects the first two processes:
∆Turnout t = Turnout t-1 - ∆Proximity t - Proximity t-1 + ∆Proximity t-1 + Proximity t-2

(3: turnout)

The functioning of the different terms in these equations will be described in light of the findings
they give rise to. In Table A1, the first two models (A and B) use data that aggregates, to the party

1

These models take the form of so-called Error Correction Models (ECMs detailed in Jennings 2013). Such
models come with methodological concerns (De Boef and Keele 2008) discussed in Appendix C.
1

level, the proportions of votes received by each party and similarly recasts proximity as a party
attribute.2 Models C and D instead focus on proportions voting among birthyear-cohorts, treating as
a single unit all respondents born in the same year in a particular country. Aggregation is a
straightforward way to obtain time-series cross-section data from individual-level survey data; and
these two aggregations (to the party and birthyear cohort levels) also makes sense substantively – the
party level for obvious reasons and the birthyear level because my individual-level theorizing focuses
not on the behavior of individuals but on the behavior of cohorts of respondents who enter their
electorates together at the time of specific elections.3 All the models in this table contain coefficients
that focus on how past values of inputs (independent variables) affect current outcome (dependent
variable) values; but it is important to notice how the lag structure for these effects differs between
models. In Models A and C the focus is on effects coming from the previous election (at t-1) whereas
in Models B and D the focus is rather on effects coming from the election before that (at t-2).
In Model A the outcome (dependent variable) is change in party support between the current and
previous time-points – referred to in this research tradition as a “differenced outcome” and signalled

2

Franklin and Lutz (2020) used as their data source the Integrated Module Dataset (IMD) from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES 2018) and for this appemdix I use the same source. Doing so adds
election studies conducted after 1995 in Brazil, Czechia, Greece, Ireland, Korea, Latvia, Mexico, Peru, Poland,
Portugal, Solvenia and Spain to the countries that are the main focus of the chapter (Italy and the Netherlands
were dropped because some election studies were missing from the IMD, producing estimation problems).
Several of these countries did not conduct free and fair elections continuously since 1945, as implied in the
main text. But at the party level we do not need continuity in generational cohorts. The number of parties
available for analysis is a more pressing concern. This dataset differs from the one used for my work with
Georg Lutz in containing additional surveys that became available only in December 2020 with Release 2 of
the IMD. This increases the number of parties available for analysis but hardly affects the findings.
3
Birthyear cohorts, of course, fit within electoral cohorts while giving us aggregate units of roughly the same
sizes (but see Appendix C regarding the weighting of those units). Had we aggregated to the electoral cohort
level these would have had very different sizes depending on the time elapsed between elections (inter-election
periods can sometimes be quite short, producing rather small incoming cohorts at the next election).
2

Table A1 Party and birth-year level (fixed effects) analyses of party support and turnout (IMD
data)
Level of analysis:

Party-level analyses

Birthyear cohort analyses

Concept:

Model A
Representation
(party support)

Model B
Feedback
(policy adjustment)

Model C
Negative
concomitant †

Model D
Feedback
(correction)

Outcome:

Voted for party

Proximity to party

Turnout

Turnout

Input:
1) Lagged outcome
2) D.left-right proximity t
3) Left-right proximity t-1
4) D.voted for party t-1
5) Voted for party t-2
6) D.left-right proximity t-1
7) Left-right proximity t-2

Coef. (s.e.)
-1.13 (0.07)
0.46 (0.10)
0.72 (0.15)

Intercept

-0.40 (0.10)

R-squared
Observations
Number of party-elections
Number of country-birthyears

Coef. (s.e.)
-1.32 (0.09)

Coef. (s.e.)
-1.36 (0.02)
-0.23 (0.06)
-0.30 (0.10)

Coef. (s.e.)
-1.46 (0.03)

-0.09 (0.07) n.s.
-0.34 (0.11)
0.28 (0.10)
0.43 (0.16)
0.98 (0.06)

0.64
364
174

0.75
184
103

1.27 (0.07)

0.82 (0.12)

0.66
4,363

0.73
2,387

2,006

1,324

Note: All coefficients significant at p<0.001, one-tailed unless marked n.s. (not significant).
† Model C is viewed as a concomitant of Model A (see accompanying text).

by use, as prefix, of the Greek letter delta (∆). The first input is a lagged but not differenced version
of the same outcome variable. Known as the “error correction parameter” (ECP), its value reflects
how long it takes for deviations from an equilibrium outcome to decay. An ECP of -1.0 would correspond to an equilibrium that was restored over the course of a single time-point (in these data, the
4-year average gap between elections). Models in Table A1 all have ECP values within 0.5 of -1.0,
suggesting that equilibrium would be restored within the final two years of each inter-election period
(or, in other words, that short-term deviations from equilibrium are ephemeral).
The other inputs to each model come in pairs: differenced inputs being paired with lagged inputs.
For each pair, the differenced input tells us the short-term effect of the variable in question – the
effect that will dissipate over the period governed by the ECM – whereas the lagged input tells us the
3

long-term effect. So, in Model A, the short-term effect (0.46 in Row 2) will have dissipated by the
time the next election is due, leaving an effect of 0.72 (Row 3) to carry over into the longer term.4
Of course, I do not suppose that survey respondents necessarily see this process in left-right terms,
but the way in which voters’ left-right positions react to parties’ left-right policy stances evidently
involve (and apparently provide good stand-ins for) voters’ cognitive processes, whatever those may
be. The results tell us (unsurprisingly) that voters reward their parties (with additional votes) as
proximity improves and punish them (by withdrawing electoral support) as proximity declines.
Model B changes the focus from support to proximity, assessing to what extent parties respond to
changes in voter support by adjusting their policy stances. Here we expect negative feedback
(Deutsch 1963; Easton 1965; Franklin, Soroka and Wlezien 2014), with parties responding to reduced
support by trying to improve the fit of their policies to voter preferences and responding to increased
support by permitting those policies to stray from voter preferences (cf. Harkvardien 2010).5
However, we do not expect this feedback to be immediate. It takes time for parties to alter their
policy stances and yet more time for them to communicate those changes to voters. So in Model B
we look for effects from party support at the election before last, with a short-term (differenced)
measure from t-1 (Row 4) and a long-term (lagged) measure from t-2 (Row 5). The short-term effect
is small and not statistically significant, but the long-term effect (-0.34 in Row 5) is of substantial
magnitude, within sampling error (2-sigma confidence interval) of matching the corresponding

4

Initially the short- and long-term effects are felt in conjunction, but only the long-term effect persists. That
effect can also move the series to a new equilibrium (see discussion regarding the chapter’s Figure 1).

5

Actually, we cannot tell from these data whether parties move closer to their voters by changing their stances
or whether they succeed in persuading their voters to accept the positions they (the parties) have taken. In
other work (Franklin 2015, 2017) I have shown that about half the movement is in party stances, with the
remainder being produced either by parties’ persuasive success or by assimilation for voters who “persuade
themselves” that they stand with their parties.
4

long-term effect in the opposite direction (+0.72), seen Model A’s Row 3.
In Models C and D we shift our attention to turnout. Here the outcome is the proportion casting a
ballot among different cohorts of respondents. Again the pair of models show effects with different
signs at different lags, but for these two models the outcome (dependent) variable is the same. And,
importantly, we see negative effects in the first model of the pair being corrected by positive effects
two elections later, providing support for the theorizing expounded in the main text.
It may be surprising to see that turnout is lower when parties receive higher support, but bear in
mind that turnout responds to electoral competition (Franklin 2004). Parties might well receive
maximum support at precisely the point when competition is lowest, and vice versa. There is no
necessary delay inherent in decisions whether to vote or not.6 So the delay we see following the
negative effect (in Model C) before its reversal (in Model D) is telling. It corresponds exactly with
the time delay underlying the transformation of maliable younger individuals into older members of
the electorate with established habits of voting (or not) – a delay that was the focus of the corresponding individual-level analysis presented in the main text’s Table 22.1. What we see are short-term
individual-level turnout variations apparently responding to competitive variations at the party level
– turnout responses that are subject to later corrections due to generational replacement.
But these findings must be treated as tentative. The connection between high proximity and low
levels of electoral competition is still speculative; and the use of error-correction models in crosssectional time-series as short as those used here may presents problem, as suggested in Appendix C.

6

In the main text I argued that younger, more maleable, voters can respond immediately to novel features of an electoral
situation while for older voters, already set in habits of voting or non voting, change can come only with generational
replacement. In Models C and D we see both types of change occurring: change due to the maleability of yourger voters
in Model C and change due to generational replacement in Model D. The distinction makes it clear that individual-level
short-term effects can have what, in ECM terminology, are seen as long-term effects. As stressed in the main text, these
concepts (while broadly consistent across modeling strategies) are not the same and can overlap.

5
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Appendix B: Supplementary findings and robustness checks using the 14-country dataset

As explained in the main text, I chose to use linear probability models (OLS) for the analyses
reported in the chapter because interactions are central to those analyses and first differences from
logit results are undefined for interaction terms (Ai and Norton 2003; Buis 2010). The raw logit
results are exceedingly hard to interpret, and would have made impossible the sorts of statements
about coefficient sizes that are called for in the main text. In Table B1 I show logit results for coefficients in the main text’s Table 22.1, Model D, that are not interaction terms, demonstrating that the
findings from a logit analysis would be substantively the same, if different in detail. Note that
comparisons are made difficult by the fact that, since interaction effects are undefined, colinearity
Table B1 Comparison between OLS findings and Logit findings for Table 22.1, Model D
Outcome: Voted
Inputs:
Quasi-lagged outcome
Long-term covariates
Partisanship
Proximity to party
Newly adult recently

Logit coefficients and first differences
(Robust
Coef. Std. Err.)
dy/dx (Std.Err.)
1.41 (0.01)

0.19 (0.00)

Reference results
from main text
Coef. (Std. Err.)
0.25 (0.00)

1.42 (0.03)
0.08 (0.05) n.s.
-0.21 (0.08)

0.19 (0.00)
0.01 (0.01) n.s.
-0.03 (0.00)

0.15 (0.00)
0.01 (0.01) n.s.
-0.08 (0.00)

Demographic and knowledge covariates
Age
0.00 (0.00) n.s.
Age squared
0.00 (0.00) n.s.
Education
0.32 (0.01)
Relition
0.15 (0.04)
Marital status
0.82 (0.02)
Income
0.11 (0.01)
Knowledge
0.71 (0.04)
Union membership
0.23 (0.03)

0.00 (0.00) n.s.
0.00 (0.00) n.s.
0.04 (0.00)
0.04 (0.00)
0.08 (0.00)
0.02 (0.00)
0.11 (0.00)
0.03 (0.00)

0.05 (0.03) n.s.
-0.05 (0.03) n.s.
0.03 (0.00)
0.08 (0.00)
0.11 (0.00)
0.02 (0.00)
0.07 (0.00)
0.00 (0.00) n.s.

Interactions with newly adult
Fixed effects

YES
YES

YES
YES

YES
YES

Note: Fixed effects. All coefficients significant at p<0.001 except where marked n.s. (not significant).
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effects for interactions are also undefined. Thus, even though the logit model contained all the same
terms as the linear probability model in the main text, there may be differences in coefficient values
even for constitutive terms, due to model misspecification in the Logit model that go beyond
differences due simply to use of a logit transformation for that model’s dependent variable.
Tables 22.1 and 22.2 in the main text are incomplete because interactions with the variable ‘New
at recent election’ were not displayed for reasons of space. In Table 22.2 most of the effects for
demographic constitutive terms were also omitted for the same reason. Table B2 shows the missing
coefficients for Tables 22.1, (Model D) and 22.2 (Model C). These are the age-related interTable B2 Coefficients missing from Tables 22.1 and 22.2 in the main text
Constitutive term /
interaction with
Age
Age-squared
Education
Religion
Marital status
Income
Knowledge
Union membership

Table 22.1, Model D,
interactions with
recently adult
-0.00 (0.01)
0.00 (0.00)
0.02 (0.00)
0.05 (0.01)
-0.05 (0.00)
0.01 (0.00)
0.10 (0.01)
0.02 (0.00)

Table 22.2, Model C
constitutive terms

0.02 (0.00)
0.01 (0.00)
0.12 (0.00)
0.01 (0.00)
0.07 (0.01)
0.01 (0.00)

Table 22.2, Model
C, interactions with
recently adult
-0.00 (0.00)
0.00 (0.00)
0.03 (0.00)
0.06 (0.01)
-0.06 (0.00)
0.01 (0.00)
0.07 (0.01)
0.02 (0.00)

Note: Fixes effects OLS. All coefficients significant at p< 0.001.

actions (referred to as such in the main text) that help to render age itself insignificant by specifying
at least some of the ways in which start-up effects arise (a topic for future research).
In the main text I raised the question how many elections does it take for a voter to become set
in his or her ways and asserted that it makes little difference to the findings whether the cut-off point
was taken at two elections or three. Table B3 demonstrates the small differences made by choice of
8

cut-off using a subset of the variables employed in Table 22.2, Model C in the main text. Differences
are only of substantive importance for one variable: party cohesiveness (party discipline).
Table B3 Demonstration effects of the indicator ‘Newly adult at recent election’ with different
codings, using the 14-country dataset
Outcome: Voted

Newly adult after 2 elections

Inputs:
Quasi-lagged outcome
Long-term effects
Partisan strength
Proximity to party
Clarity of election
Marginality
Time-gap from previous election
Cohesive party system
Newly adult
Short-term interactions
New * partisanship
New * proximity
New * clarity
New * marginality
New * time-gap
New * cohesive
Fixed effects
Intercept
R-squared
Observations

Coefficient (s.e.)
0.278 (0.002)

Newly adult after 3 elections
Coefficient (s.e.)
0.278 (0.002)

0.156 (0.004)
0.021 (0.005)
-0.029 (0.006)
0.013 (0.005) n.s.
0.013 (0.007) n.s.
0.007 (0.005) n.s.
-0.089 (0.015)

0.156 (0.004)
0.020 (0.005)
-0.038 (0.006)
0.012 (0.005) n.s.
0.006 (0.008) n.s.
0.024 (0.005)
-0.092 (0.015)

0.036 (0.006)
-0.056 (0.008)
0.110 (0.009)
0.047 (0.008)
-0.078 (0.014)
0.029 (0.006)
YES

0.035 (0.006)
-0.050 (0.008)
0.127 (0.009)
0.054 (0.008)
-0.059 (0.013)
0.002 (0.006) n.s.
YES

0.406 (0.010)
0.218
286,654

0.389 (0.010)
0.217
286,654

Note: Fixed effects OLS. All coefficients significant at p<0.001 except where marked n.s. (not significant).

In the main text (and analyses reported in this appendix) I weighted the data to official turnout,
as reported by the International IDEA Voter Turnout project. However, the findings are only
marginally affected by whether weights are used or not, as shown in Table B4 that uses the same
demonstration variable subset used for Table B3. The only substantively meaningful difference is
for long-term time-gap since the previous election which, with unweighted data, gains a significant
9

effect in the wrong direction. Only four other pairs of coefficients show differences larger than can
be accommodated by the third digit, and none of these differences are substantively telling.
Table B4 Demonstration effects of findings with and without weighting to official turnout (14country data)
Outcome: Voted

Findings with unweighted data

Inputs:
Quasi-lagged outcome

Coefficient (s.e.)
0.219 (0.002)

Findings with weighted data
Coefficient (s.e.)
0.278 (0.002)

Long-term effects
Partisan strength
Proximity to party
Clarity of election
Marginality
Time-gap from previous election
Cohesive party system
Newly adult

0.100
0.022
-0.033
0.006
-0.015
0.052
-0.106

(0.004)
(0.005)
(0.006)
(0.005) n.s.
(0.005)
(0.003)
(0.010)

0.156
0.020
-0.038
0.012
0.006
0.024
-0.092

(0.004)
(0.005)
(0.006)
(0.005)
(0.008) n.s.
(0.005)
(0.015)

Short-term interactions
New * partisanship
New * proximity
New * clarity
New * marginality
New * time-gap
New * cohesive

0.032
-0.049
0.117
0.051
-0.020
0.010

(0.004)
(0.006)
(0.005)
(0.006)
(0.008) n.s
(0.004) n.s.

0.035
-0.050
0.127
0.054
-0.059
0.002

(0.006)
(0.008)
(0.009)
(0.008)
(0.013)
(0.006) n.s.

Fixed effects
Intercept
R-squared
Observations

YES
0.507 (0.010)
0.169
286,654

YES
0.389 (0.010)
0.217
286,654

Note: Fixed effects OLS. All coefficients significant at p<0.001 except where marked n.s. (not significant).

A note on respondent perceptions of party positions
A final topic that should be addressed in this appendix is the accuracy of voter perceptions of party
positions in left-right terms. In the chapter I wrote with Georg Lutz we positioned parties on the
basis of expert judgements. In this replication of the Lutz analysis I preferred to use voter judgements
10

because those are theoretically preferable (and, incidentally, performed better). I should note,
however, that the judgements that performed better were judgements on the part of voters who placed
themselves differently than they placed the parties they voted for. The ranking of the three measures
of party location in terms of the performance of resulting models were (1) respondent rankings of
parties, omitting the party they reported voted for, (2) rankings by experts recruited by the PIs of the
respective election studies and (3) respondent rankings of parties, including the party each
respondent reported voting for.
This ranking is not surprising given that the main criticism of respondent-judged party positions
is that respondents would tend to be biassed by seeing themselves as closer to the party they voted
for than was actually the case. By excluding respondents who might have been biassed in this fashion
I obtained what appeared to be better judgeents even than were obtained from so-called “experts.”
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Appendix C: Methodological concerns regarding error correction models as used in Appendix A

Appendix A employed error correction models that describe the way in which equilibrium levels are
maintained in support for political parties (building on work reported in Franklin and Lutz 2020)
and in turnout. I suggest that turnout equilibriation is a by-product of processes yielding equilibrium
party support. Linkages between the two processes involve well-established relationships between
electoral outcomes, party competition and turnout. An appropriate statistical approach to representing such relationships, and the resulting dynamics of turnout and party support, is to use error
correction model (ECMs). This is not my idea. ECMs have been used previously for modeling
linkages between voter preferences and government policy stances (for a survey see Jennings 2013).
My innovation is to use the same means for studying party policy stances.
ECMs have the great advantage of being extremely flexible, making no assumptions about the
nature of dynamic processes under study – provided the error correction parameter (described in
Appendix A) is negative and statistically significant (Kennedy 2008). Instead, as in other autoregressive distributed lag (ADL) models, of which the ECM is a variant, the dynamic processes can
be discovered empirically by trying out different lags and discarding those that prove not significant.
In this research I was not able to go very far in evaluating different possibilities since the short series
of time-points available to me in the IMD would not let me try out lags beyond the third. However,
the third lag was never statistically significant, suggesting that later lags would not be either.
ECMs, used in this way, are not subject to problems that beset many other approaches to timeseries modeling (problems of non-stationarity, unit roots, and the like) for reasons expounded in De
Boef and Keele (2008). However, I have been unable to find any examples in the statistical,
econometric or political science literature of ECMs employing data with as small a number of timepoints as are available to me here. But neither have I found any cautions against using datasets such
12

as the IMD that get their power in statistical analysis from the number of panels rather than from the
number of time-points.7 Still, I focused the main text of this chapter on analyses that use more
conventional methods for spelling out the implications of my insights.

A note on weighting
Although the statistical demands of ECM analysis seem unproblematic for my purposes, the data do
have to be aggregated to the party level for Models A and B of Table A1 and to the birthyear cohort
level for Models C and D. Since we start with survey data that itself is weighted, and which has
different numbers of respondents in different birthyear cohorts, the question how to weight the
survey data for each of these aggregation exercises is an important one.
For the party-level analyses I weighted by the same weight used at the individual level: the weight
that produces proportions voting that match official turnout figures. This should also give us close
to accurate data for the support given to each party, and presumably also for the left-right location
of each party. The actual number of respondents associated with each party is irrelevant because
each party is a separate unit irrespective of now many supporters it has.
Things are different when it comes to birthyear cohorts. Again these need to be weighted to the
average turnout found empirically, but they also need to be weighted according to the number of
respondents in each cohort. So, for analyses in Models C and D of Table A1 the aggregation process
is doubly weighted, by the size of each cohort as well as the turnout rate.

7

It was not possible for me to attempt a replication of Appendix A findings using my 14-country dataset
because that dataset does not have standardized codings of political party IDs, as are provided for the IMD.
So I could not aggregate my 14-country dataset to the party level of analysis. See Appendix D footnote 8 for
a circumstance where IMD data appears unsuited to ECM analysis, for lack of a sufficiently lengthy timeseries.
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Appendix D: Replication of Table 22.2’s findings using ECMs with the 14-country dataset
Given the importance of negative feedback in the theorizing that underlies Chapter 22 – theorizing strongly
supported by findings from error correction models that are the focus of Appendix A – readers may wonder
why I do not also use error correction models (ECMs) in the main text. The reason is that error correction
models are suited to studying a different set of concerns than the models in the main text. ECMs evaluate a
series of observations (often labeled “realizations”) in terms of the statistical requirements for those
observations to be held in a state of dynamic equilibrium through the operations of so-called “long-term”
and “short-term” effects. The long-term and short-term forces that are the subject of the chapter itself are
tied to a quite different sort of theory regaring the dynamic properties of a sequence of observations – a

14

social science theory about how human beings acquire certain patterns of behavior. There is no requirement
that the resulting series of observations be in any sort of equilibrium. However, it is sometimes mentioned
that the progression of turnout realizations occurring in practice do appear to follow a pattern suggesting
not only conformity with a social science theory but also conformity with the existence of a statistical
equilibrium. Appendix A addressed this conjecture by spelling out and confirming (so far as such things
can be confirmed) the nature of the supposed equilibrium. The chapter itself tries (inter alia) to spell out the
observable implications of such an equilibrium for human behavior, as studied with conventional methods.
Nevertheless, it can be instructive to discover the extent to which the coefficients we get from a model
based on social science theory match those we get from a model based on statistical theory. Since both
theories talk about long-term versus short-term effects there should be at least some points of comparison
if only to validate our use of the same labels in both contexts. Table D1 shows the coefficients resulting
from an error correction analysis of turnout at the birthyear cohort level and juxtaposes these coefficients
with coefficients to which the same labels (“long-term” versus “short-term”) are applied, taken from Table
22.2 in the main text but re-arranged to suit the format I have employed for the display of ECM coefficients.8
Perhaps surprisingly, the ECM version of these findings (Model A) provides a generally clearer
picture regarding long-term coefficients, matching more closely the theorizing and findings in
Franklin (2004) that were confirmed by later research (especially Johnston et al. 2007); Bruter and
Harrison 2009). For effects theorized to be long-term, the short-term effects in that model are all
non-signficant (at the slightly lower significance level chosen for this table), quite in contrast to the
rather muddy findings seen in Model B. But Model A’s findings also include a bigger anomaly than

8

The data for Model A in Table D1 come from the same source as the data used for Model B: my 14-country
dataset, used for analyses in the main text of this chapter. Those data have a much longer time-span than the
IMD data, going back to the 1960s for some countries. A separate analysis of the same model using IMD data
(not shown) brings to light a problem that can apparently result from using short time-panels: no coefficients
are significant. This might perhaps be due to a relatively low error correction parameter (lagged depvar), also
seen in Model A. Speculatively, slower error correction might call for longer time-series.
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any other in Table D1: no significant effect of eligiblity to vote at 18, either long-term or short-term.
Table D1 Comparing ECM findings with original findings for Table 22.2, Model C
Model A
Model B
ECM version of
Restructured Table
Table 22.2, Model C
22.2, Model C
Coef. (s.e.)
Coef.
(s.e.)
-0.82 (0.01)
0.26 (0.00

Outcome: turnout
Inputs:
(Quasi-) lagged outcome
Newly theorized variables
D.(short-term) partisanship
L.(long-term) partisanship
D.(short-term) proximity
L(long-term) proximity

0.22
0.12
-0.10
-0.19

(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.03)

Variables derived from past theorizing
D.(short-term) electoral clarity
L.(long-term) electoral clarity
D.(short-term)marginality
L.(long-term) marginality
D.(short-term) time-gap
L.(long-term) time-gap
D.(short-term) cohesive
L.(long-term) cohesive
D.(short-term) compulsory voting
L.(long-term) compulsory voting
D.(short-term) electorate size
L.(long-term) electorate size
D.(short-term) legislative responsiveness
L (long-term) legislative responsiveness
D.(short-term) eligible to vote at 18
L.(long-term) eligible to vote at 18
Recently adult

-0.01
0.01
0.05
0.04
-0.03
-0.06
-0.00
0.03
0.04
0.06
-0.08
-0.07
0.00
0.13
-0.01
0.00
-0.04

(0.01) n.s.
(0.01) n.s.
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.02)
(0.01) n.s.
(0.01)
(0.02) n.s.
(0.01)
(0.19) n.s.
(0.03)
(0.00) n.s.
(0.03)
(0.01) n.s.
(0.01) n.s.
(0.01)

Fixed effects
Effects of demographics and knowledge
Intercept

YES
NO
0.65 (0.04)

R-squared
Observations
Birthyear-cohorts / countries

0.50
6,463
1,130

0.18
0.16 (0.00)
0.02
0.00 (0.01) n.s.
0.10
-0.05
0.07
0.01
-0.07
0.05
0.02
0.02
0.22
0.12
0.08
0.08
0.11
0.06
-0.02
-0.07
-0.14

(0.01) n.s.
(0.01) n.s.
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
n.s.
(0.03)
(0.02)
(0.00)
(0.02)

YES
YES
0.10 (0.02)
0.25
261,879
14

Note: All coefficients significant at p<0.01 except where marked n.s. (not significant). Shortterm effects for Model B sum the short-term interactions and the long-term effects shown
in Table 22.2, Model D (standard errors cannot be computed for these summations).
Demographics are not relevant to Model A and so are omitted from that model.
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By contrast, for votes at 18 as well as for effects theorized to be short-term, the picture is clearer
in Model B. For effects theorized to be primarily short-term (clarity and marginality) long-term
coefficients fail to reach statistical significance in this model, as theorized, whereas the long-term
coefficient for votes at 18 shows the dominance expected from past theorizing. So, although lacking
the crispness seen for most of the long-term findings in Model A, Model B coefficients (derived
from this chapter’s main text) more closely align with past findings.
Turning to variables (partisanship and proximity) introduced to support this chapter’s theorizing,
the ECM coefficients in Model A give a much better sense of their overall importance, as was only
to be expected. To repeat: a standard regression model is suited for representing the outcomes of
forces with origins in human behavior; an ECM can only show whether those operations result in an
equilibrium outcome. There is no reason why forces mainly responsible for that equilibrium should
mirror the pattern of forces seen in the original regression model.
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